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Agreements for Small Corporation Control
Stanley Morganstern *
A CLOSE CORPORATION, one owned by a few shareholders, has many
unique problems which if not recognized and anticipated may well
destroy it. No one plan can be made for all close corporations, as the
circumstances, botl" present and future, must dictate particular pro-
visions of each plan.
Shareholders' Agreement
The plan needed to cope with the myriad of problems which might
threaten profitable existence of a small business corporation derives its
effectiveness through drafting such plan into what is commonly called
a shareholders' agreement. Legal enforceability is the element which
makes the agreement effective. Although shareholders are limited by law
to the extent that they may agree to act in concert, the shareholders'
agreement is a tool by which the interests of the corporation and indi-
vidual shareholders are best protected.'
The holders of shares of stock of a close corporation choose the cor-
porate form so as to, at least in theory, limit their personal liability and
assure continuation of business beyond the departure of one of the prin-
cipals. They do not usually wish to be bound by statutory requirements
which might prevent them from exercising the degree of control they
desire over the affairs of the corporation. The overall objective of the
shareholders' agreement, then, is to insure continued corporate existence
and its advantages, while at the same time to provide the holders with
some of the basic attributes of a partnership.
There are several inherent problems in every close corporation
which dictate basic objectives of a shareholders' agreement. Success
factors of a close corporation usually are particular skills of one or more
of the major shareholders or an intangible asset such as a production
process, a patent or even a customer list. These factors require that one
objective be to limit the entrance of outsiders who might reveal these
secrets, and to assure that insiders leaving the corporation will not use
their knowledge to compete. Outsiders may often interrupt smooth oper-
ations of a business and the exit of an insider may result in dispropor-
tionate control. Holders of shares of stock of a close corporation should
be extremely interested in not only acquiring the partnership attribute
of delectus personae, the ability to choose who shall and who shall not
* Of the Ohio Bar; associated with the law firm of Roemisch and Wright of
Cleveland.
1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law 464 (1 vol. Student ed., 1960); and in detail in,
3 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, c. 56-58 (1965 supp. ed.).
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be an owner, but also in assuring that one owner's proportionate control
will not be diluted by the transfer of another's shares.
Since there is little trading in close corporate shares, valuation is
difficult. At some time during corporate life, a shareholder may wish to
liquidate his investment, or his widow may be forced to. An agreement
controlling the dispersion of those shares is of little value if the price at
which the shares are to be transferred is not stated or ascertainable with-
out considerable negotiation. A swift and orderly transfer of shares at
the happening of a named contingency is an important objective of the
shareholders' agreement, but no more important than assuring the trans-
feror of full value for his shares.
Majority shareholders in a close corporation are usually concerned
with earning a large return on their investments either as salaries or
dividends.2 The presence of minority holders, who often are more inter-
ested in financially sound, continued existence of the corporation, dic-
tates the need for an agreement which will satisfy both interests.3 Dis-
satisfied minority holders can cause a great deal of expense and litigation.
The existence of minority interests certainly will affect the agreement as
to how directors will be elected, the level of salaries to be paid, and how
and when dividends will be paid.
The most basic objectives of a shareholders' agreement concerns the
right to control day to day operations and major policy decisions of the
corporation. Within limits, shareholders may agree as to directors and
officers, when and if these people will be removed from office, salaries to
be paid, methods of resolving disputes, voting procedures of the board
and types of action needing shareholder approval. Further, shareholders
may agree that at the happening of a specified event they will vote their
shares in a predetermined manner.
Beyond these basic problems, the objectives and ultimate provisions
of a shareholders' agreement depend upon particular needs and wishes
of shareholders. Circumstances existing at the time of incorporation and
anticipated changes should mold the agreement. Ages and health of
shareholders will determine the relative possibilities of death or dis-
ability causing a need for transferring ownership. The number of share-
holders, their respective holdings and business skills are factors to con-
sider when determining particular provisions of the agreement. Antici-
pated future growth and needs for more financing, be it equity or debt,
will bear heavily on provisions establishing dividend and salary policies,
as well as on those safeguarding the proportionate ownership. Tax con-
sequences, both as to the corporation and individual shareholders, must
also be considered before choosing a plan of action.
20'Neal, Minority Owners Can Avoid Squeeze-Outs, 41 Harv. Bus. Rev. 150 (1963).
3 Ibid.
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Once general objectives of the agreement have been established,
it is important to consider some of the alternative paths which may be
followed in accomplishing each of these objectives.
Control Through Voting
Control of the corporation, through voting power, is initially dis-
persed by issuance of securities. The type and number of securities re-
ceived by each shareholder determines his ability to control corporate
activities. A shareholders' agreement should specify with clarity the
relative voting power to be possessed by each investor, and the issuance
of securities will effectuate those provisions. Consideration of existing
circumstances is imperative in determining how control should initially
be divided. Further, it is important for the investor to understand the
nature of the securities he holds, whether they be debt or equity.
Capitalization of a small business corporation usually consists only
of common shares equally divided among the owners with profit distri-
bution, voting rights and participation at liquidation being equal. To
fully understand his rights and obligations, the shareholder must look
beyond the terms of the stock certificate into the corporate charter and
bylaws, the statutes of the state and applicable case law.
4
Circumstances may dictate a departure from normal practice. A
corporation beginning business may be in need of more capital than the
principal shareholders can provide. At this juncture, shareholders must
decide whether to raise required capital by means of issuing additional
shares of stock or debt securities or a combination of each. The latter
might be the first choice of the shareholders if they do not wish to relin-
quish any control over corporate activities. Realistically, debt securities
are not always the answer. Investors supplying capital to a new business
usually are interested in protecting their funds by having some control
over the use of those funds. It may be necessary, in order to attract
needed capital, to relinquish some control at least for the period over
which the investors will have their capital returned.
Although debt financing is attractive from a tax viewpoint,5 a large
amount of debt may make the corporation too thinly capitalized. If this
occurs, the Internal Revenue Service might be inclined to treat debt as
equity and interest payments as dividends.6
If an investor insists on some control, but debt securities appear to
be appropriate from a corporate viewpoint, a voting arrangement may be
entered into whereby the investor is accorded his desired control, but is
willing to take a note, debenture or other debt security. The voting
4 Votaw, Modem Corporations 44 (1965).
5 101 Tax Management, Corporations-Pre-Organization Planning A-21 (1965).
6 Id. at A-22; Shaker-Lee Theatre Co., 14 T.C.M. 452 (1958).
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arrangement should extend no longer than a term commensurate with
repayment of the debt, and may be limited in scope to issues concerning
disbursement of borrowed funds. In this way, the creditor will be pro-
tected while long-range control of the corporation will not be affected.
An investor may be satisfied without managerial control if he has
a superior claim over other shareholders as to earnings and assets at
liquidation. A pure debt security will give him both of these protections,
but a preferred stock will do the same. Other investors may be satisfied
with a mere speculative return and desire common shares. Here, non-
voting shares would satisfy the investor without diluting proportionate
voting control.
7
Major shareholders may wish to attract several small investors, per-
haps employees. If it is felt that nonvoting common shares are appro-
priate, initial capitalization may consist of a large series of nonvoting
common and a small series of voting or management stock." Alterna-
tively, stock retained by management could be endowed with multiple
votes per share, while stock dispersed to small investors would be en-
titled to only one vote per share.9
Before distribution of control, as provided by initial capitalization,
is altered by provisions of a shareholders' agreement, legal aspects of
voting rights generally should be understood.
The basic tests of the validity of any provision of a shareholders'
agreement are 1) compatability of the agreement with public policy,
2) adherence of the agreement to state laws and the corporate charter,
and 3) effects of the agreement on rights of creditors and other share-
holders."'
The statutory norms within which the corporation must exist are
guideposts to be followed when drafting an agreement." Beyond basic
statutory requirements of filing a corporate charter, keeping corporate
books and records, filing a corporate tax return and acting within the
powers granted by the state through the charter,'1 2 shareholders are also
bound to respect legal limitations on voting arrangements.
Shareholders cannot conduct day-to-day operations. 13 Agreements
which attempt to divest the board of directors of their power to exercise
independent judgment in determining policies of the corporation are
7 2 Lasser, Executive Course in Profitable Business Management 56, 57 (1952).
8 Grange & Woodbury, Corporation Law-Operating Procedures for Officers and Di-
rectors 169 (2d ed. 1964).
9 Ibid.
10 Fletcher, 5 Cyclopedia Corporations, Stock and Stockholders § 2064 (1961 rev. ed.).
11 Robinson, Agreements and the Statutory Norm, 43 Cornell L. Q. 68 (1957).
12 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 1.
13 Robinson, op. cit. supra n. 11.
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invalid.1 4 The agreement may, however, control actions of the board to
the extent of specifying who corporate officers are to be, 15 what salaries
are to be paid,16 what dividend policy shall prevail, 17 and what percent-
age of the total vote is needed to pass a board resolution.'8
Broadly speaking, an agreement may further provide that share-
holders shall vote their shares in a prescribed manner when unusual
issues, needing a shareholder vote, arise.19 These may include removal
of directors, liquidation, merger or consolidation or submission of dis-
agreements to arbitration.20
Majority owners cannot, by agreement, exclude minority owners
from exercising their percentage of control. 21 All voting agreements must
be entered into in good faith and must be consistent with the interest of
creditors, shareholders and the corporation alike.22 The clearest and most
simple way of explaining the legal qualifications of a valid voting
arrangement was established in Clark v. Dodge23 which set forth the No
Damage Test. A voting agreement is not illegal as being against public
policy merely because it slightly impinges on statutory provisions. Dam-
ages, suffered or threatened, to the public and other shareholders deter-
mine the validity of the agreement.
The drafting of the agreement can insure its validity if notice is paid
to the above factors at which the courts usually look in determining the
legal efficacy of a voting arrangement.
The most important legal aspect is the pyramid of corporate struc-
ture which must not be altered by the agreement.24 Within this pyramid,
shareholders must elect directors, directors must establish corporate
policy, and officers must execute those policies.2 5
Every state grants to the shareholders of corporations the power to
elect a board of directors who will be responsible for management of
corporate activities.26 This power is the shareholders most important
14 McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
15 Schmith v. Fornander, 26 Misc. 2d 239, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Kronen-
berg v. Sullivan County Steam Laundry Co., 91 N.Y.S. 2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
16 Robinson, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 76.
17 O'Neal, Close Corporations, § 5.02 (1958).
18 Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A. 2d 180 (1953).
19 Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 Yale L.J.
1040, 1045 (1950).
20 Ibid.
21 Bostwick v. Chapman, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1890).
22 Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
23 Ibid.
24 Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning for
the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427 (1953).
25 Id. at 428.
26 Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 7 Corp. Practice Commen-
tator 321 (1966).
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right.27 In the absence of a cumulative voting arrangement or other
modifying provisions of a shareholders' agreement each shareholder is
entitled to cast as many votes as the number of shares he owns.28 If this
voting procedure is followed, the majority shareholders will elect each
and every director. When there are minority interests involved, how-
ever, there are two basic voting procedures which may be used to insure
them representation on the board.
Cumulative voting, a statutory creation,29 allows each shareholder
to cast a total number of votes equal to the number of shares he owns
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected.30 These votes may
be used in any manner the shareholder desires. He may cast them all for
one candidate or he may split them among several.31 When cumulative
voting is used, representation on the board normally is split roughly pro-
portionately to the voting strength of the shareholders.32 Besides giving
the minority a voice on all director action, representation on the board
affords them an opportunity to keep abreast of corporate activities.
3 3
When only a small number of directors are to be elected, either be-
cause the total board membership is small or the directors serve stag-
gered terms,34 cumulative voting may be of no benefit. In order for the
minority to have representation on the board, the initial capitalization
must consist of two classes of stock. Representation on the board would
be determined by each class of stock voting independently.3 5
Even if a minority holder has representation on the board, he may
have no control over the board's actions if the members representing the
majority can always, by acting together, control the passage or defeat of
a resolution. Minority interest, then, desires some veto power over
board action. If the shareholders' agreement provides that all board
action will require a unanimous vote, minority interests are well pro-
tected.3 6 Realistically, if such an agreement is upheld, the minority inter-
ests could use that power in an unreasonable manner to the extent of
rendering the corporation completely inflexible.37
Alternatively the shareholders' agreement may provide that a high
percentage vote, short of unanimity, be required on all action, 8 or better
27 Ibid.
28 State v. Gray, 20 Ohio App. 26, 153 N.E. 187 (1925).
29 In re Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 A. 128 (1935).
30 Grange & Woodbury, op. cit. supra n. 8 at 163.
31 White, Pace Business Law Series, Unit IV, Law of Corporations (1959).
32 Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors 6 (1951).
33 Id. at 136.
34 Id. at 141.
35 White, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 77.
36 O'Neal, op. cit. supra n. 2.
37 Id. at 164; Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829 (1945).
38 Ibid; See also, 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law 200 (1958, with 1965 supp.).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss2/13
17 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
yet, that a unanimous or high percentage vote be required on any issue
which directly affects interests of minority holders.39 In this manner, the
ability of the corporation to adjust to changing circumstances would still
exist without giving substantial interests the power to dictate corporate
policy.
40
A primary function of the board of directors is to elect officers who
will carry on routine operations of the corporation. As protection for
shareholders, who become the officers of the close corporation, long-term
employment contracts may be established.
Provisions of those contracts can be as varied as the provisions of
the shareholders' agreement itself. Usually the corporation covenants
that it will retain the named employee at a specified salary.41 More so-
phisticated provisions can include periodic increases in salary either in
a stated amount, as a percent of profits, or in a fixed proportion to
salaries of other corporate officers.42 Inherent in any such contract is
the provision that the terms of the agreement will only apply so long as
the officer continues to be loyal and act in good faith towards the cor-
poration. 43
As long as directors are not deprived of their right and duty to exer-
cise independent judgment, the shareholders' agreement may establish
reasonable standards for the board to follow in deciding whether or not
to declare a dividend. The agreement may provide that earnings or
accumulated profits of the corporation must reach a set level before the
directors would be empowered to vote for a distribution.44 This type of
provision is most important where minority interests are involved, as the
withholding of dividends can often be an effective way of squeezing
minority interests out of the corporation.45
Even though the agreement calls for dividends to be paid when sur-
plus or current year's earnings reach a specified level, there should be
some discretion vested in the board to pass a dividend if, in their judg-
ment, the corporation requires the working capital to conduct day to day
business or to meet an expected contingency.46 The need to protect cer-
tain interests should not override the need to be flexible and operational,
but creditors may require that no dividends be paid until their loans
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E. 2d 569 (1964).
42 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 2 at 163.
43 In re Burkin, 1 N.Y. 2d 570, 154 N.Y.S. 2d 898, 136 N.E. 2d 862 (1956); Fells v.
Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931).
44 Grange & Woodbury, op. cit. supra note 8 at 163; Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co.
v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E. 2d 482 (1939).
45 O'Neal, op. cit. supra n. 2.
46 Ibid.
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have been repaid. 47 A similar provision can be used to assure stock-
holders, who have lent money to the corporation, of repayment in prefer-
ence to dividend distributions.
Many small business corporations reach a point of impasse because
directors or major shareholders cannot agree on what action is to be
taken in a particular situation. A well-conceived plan should contem-
plate this problem. The shareholders can contract among themselves that
if such an impasse is encountered, they will all vote their shares in favor
of a complete dissolution of the corporation.48 It is wise to provide, how-
ever, that if a deadlock does occur, the corporation or the other share-
holders are given a first option to purchase the dissenters shares.4 9 If
the shareholders are equally divided so that identification of a dissenter
is impossible, the agreement may provide that between the two sides one
will buy and the other will sell their shares at a specified price.50
Arbitration agreements can be very effective in preventing dissolu-
tion. Where directors or major shareholders cannot agree on a course of
action, the agreement can provide that independent arbitrators are to be
called in and their judgment respected.5 1 Alternatively, independent
managers can be hired to take charge of the business while the prin-
cipals reconsider their positions over a predetermined period of time.
Election of directors, director resolutions, dividend policies, election
and salaries of officers and issues of an unusual nature such as dissolu-
tion are, then, the main areas in which voting rights are significant. The
shareholders' agreement can, within legal limitations, determine how
these issues will be resolved.
There are three devices which can be used to assure voting in a pre-
scribed manner. The voting trust, pooling agreement and proxy arrange-
ment all can be used to insure the continuation of control in one or more
persons. Each of these devices has its advantages and disadvantages, and
the effective use of each depends on the circumstances and objectives to
be attained. The shareholders' agreement at the creation of the corpo-
ration may establish the device, or it may be put into operation at a later
date. Although each agreement has its unique legal aspects, generally,
the validity of each will stand or fall on factors already discussed.
The simplest of these methods is the pooling agreement. Basically,
it is a simple, joint voting contract in which shareholders bind them-
selves to vote in a predetermined manner.52
47 Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W. 2d 375 (1946).
48 Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E. 2d 20 (1944).
49 Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Corporation, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 405, 442
(1959).
50 O'Neal, supra n. 2 at 159.
51 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A. 2d 441 (1947).
52 O'Neal, op. cit. supra n. 17 at § 5.03.
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A proxy may also play a role in the control of a small business
corporation. Basically, a proxy is an authorization given by the legal
owner of corporate shares to another person to enable the latter to vote
the shares. 53 Legal title is not transferred although the certificates may
be deposited with an escrow or proxy holder to assure that the shares
will not be transferred to a purchaser who is unaware of the agreement,
and not bound by it.
Unless coupled with an interest, the proxy is revocable at any time,
and if no time is specified in the agreement, most states provide that the
proxy will lapse after a statutorily stated time.54
Terms of the proxy agreement will determine the scope of power
granted to the proxy holder. He may be given the power to vote the
shares only at a single meeting or at all meetings. Limitations on the
scope of the proxy holder's power may take the form of a provision re-
quiring him to vote for specified persons or in a specified manner on
certain issues. By use of the proxy, shareholders can be sure that all
shares will be voted in a prescribed manner.
55
The third and the most complicated voting device is the voting trust.
This method, of the three, is most jealously guarded in creation and
operation by state statutes. Trust operation is initiated when the share-
holders transfer legal title to their shares to a trustee who, unlike the
proxy holder, acts as the principal owner rather than a mere agent. In
return for legal title, the original shareholders are given trust certificates
as evidence of beneficial ownership. Unless limited by agreement, the
trustee can vote the shares in any manner and for any purpose he de-
sires and may be authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of the stock.
Limitations as to the term of a voting trust are found in almost every
state.5 6 A time limitation tends to reduce the usefulness of a trust as
a device for effecting a permanent separation of ownership and control,
5 7
although some statutes allow a renewal of the term. Ideally, the term
of a voting trust, while meeting statutory limits, should be commensurate
with the length of time needed to meet the objectives of the controlled
vote.
Use of a voting trust by a small corporation is usually thought of as
a part of a salvage operation. 58 A financially weak corporation often uses
the device to insure potential investors or creditors of control over the
53 Grange & Woodbury, op. cit. supra n. 8 at 166.
54 White, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 75.
55 Grange & Woodbury, supra n. 8 at 166.
56 Sturdy, The Significance of "Form and Purpose" in Determining the Effectiveness
of Agreements Among Stockholders to Control Corporate Management, 13 Bus. Law.
283 (1958).
57 Cavitch, Ohio Corporation Law, § 4.51 (1966).
58 Grange & Woodbury, op. cit. supra n. 8 at 169.
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operations of the corporation while their money is being used to strength-
en the corporate position. Contrary to this belief, the voting trust can be
used by a financially healthy corporation whose holders wish to carry
out some definite plan.59 For example, if the holders agreed to change
the major endeavor of the corporation, they might create a voting trust
to insure voting on all issues which will bring about the desired change. 60
Participation in a voting trust usually must be available to every
member of the class of stock involved, and all shareholders have the
right to inspect the agreement. 61 Validity of the trust depends, further,
on the purpose for which it was created. It cannot be used to defeat
minority interests or to allow shareholders to exercise powers which be-
long to the board of directors. Officers and directors should not be made
trustees, but the use of shareholders as trustees is permissible and often-
times encouraged.32 Duties of the trustee should be clearly spelled out
as should limitations on their power to sell, vote a merger or consolida-
tion or to buy the stock themselves. Any profits derived from dealing
in these stocks should be reserved to the corporation.
63
While the pooling agreement seems to represent the simplest and
most satisfactory of the three at initial formation of the corporation,
either a proxy or voting trust will serve more effectively if the need
arises later in corporate life. An attempted use of a pooling agreement
or proxy may fail if it appears, in substance, to be a voting trust in non-
compliance with statutory regulations. 64 The voting trust best fits the
situation when investors or creditors desire control, but because of its
complications, it may be undesirable. Besides having to conform to stat-
utory requirements, the transfer of title to shares might be subject to
state or federal regulations.65 In addition, once the original shareholder
becomes a mere beneficial owner, he is a legal stranger to the corporation
and in danger of losing the rights normally possessed by a shareholder.6 6
Buy-Sell Agreements
One of the advantages which businessmen seek when choosing the
corporate form is continual existence of the entity. Unlike the partner-
ship, the death or other departure of an owner does not, in any case,
necessitate by law a dissolution of the entity. The departure of a share-
59 Bergman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, 37 Yale L. J. 445 (1927).
60 Cavitch, op. cit. supra n. 57.
61 DeMarco v. Paramount Ice Corp., 102 N.Y.S. 2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Henrin, Law
of Corporations 317 (1966).
62 Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 459, 121 A. 2d 302 (1956); Holmes v. Shar-
retts, 228 Md. 358, 180 A. 2d 302 (1962).
63 O'Neal, op. cit. supra n. 17 at § 5.33.
64 Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A. 2d 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957).
65 Sturdy, op. cit. supra n. 56 at 287.
66 Henn, op. cit. supra n. 61.
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holder, however, may result in a dissolution if proper plans were not
made.
Although the legal requirement of free transferability of corporate
shares and the needs of the corporation seem to be irreconcilable, they
are not. Through a buy-sell agreement the shareholders may agree that
there be reasonable partial restrictions on their right to transfer shares
if the restriction serves a valid purpose.67
There are two basic prerequisites to a valid restriction. First, the
restriction must be derived from a source of corporate power. 8 Normal-
ly, a charter or bylaw provision will be sufficient. Secondly, the restric-
tion must be reasonable. 9 Size of the entity, degree of restraint to be
imposed, length of time the restraint is to last and the best interests of
the corporation should be examined in determining reasonableness.
70
The usual form of a lifetime restriction is the first option or first
refusal type. Depending on the plan adopted either the corporation or
remaining shareholders are given a first option to buy the shares of the
departing shareholder. A lifetime restriction can also take the form of
a consent restriction through which the board of directors or other share-
holders must approve an attempted transfer to an outsider.7 1 In theory,
under this plan, there need be no accumulation of funds in anticipation
of such transfer as the approved buyer will simply replace the departing
shareholder.7 2 Legally, this type of restriction can lead to litigation if it
is felt that in substance the restriction is an absolute one. 73 The right
of first refusal provision is just as effective as the consent restriction and
is less cumbersome.
The restrictions mentioned so far are not effective to accomplish the
desired results at the death of a shareholder. In anticipation of that
event, the provision should be a mandatory one. The shareholder should
direct in his will that the sale be made as specified in the buy-sell agree-
ment.
74
A buy-sell agreement must provide that full value will be paid for
the shares and at the same time assure continued proportionate control
in the remaining shareholders. Upon a voluntary departure, a share-
holder should be bound by a covenant not to compete within a reason-
67 Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. 2d 249 (1938); Blooming-
dale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y.S. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1919). For forms, see
5 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, Forms 469-471 (1965 supp.).
68 Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Close Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev. 229
(1951).
69 Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. 2d 534, 141 N.E. 2d 812 (1957).
70 106 Tax Management, Corporate Buy-Out Agreements A-48 (1965).
71 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-11.
72 Ibid.
73 Hornstein, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 1040.
74 Davis, Life Insurance and Business Purchase Agreements 26 (1963).
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able time after the severance and within a reasonable geographic area. 75
That same shareholder should also be protected by a general release
from all past and future liability on credit given to the corporation but
guaranteed by the individual officers. As a further protection the share-
holder should be given the right to be indemnified in the event he does
become liable for such debts.76
Two types of agreements serve to accomplish the objectives stated
above. The first type is the stock redemption, or stock retirement plan.
It is also known as the entity plan, as the corporation becomes the pur-
chaser of the available shares. If the procedure under which the cor-
poration accumulates the necessary funds to purchase the stock is life
insurance, the policy on each shareholder is usually owned by the cor-
poration which pays the premiums and is the beneficiary. In order to
keep the arrangement as simple as possible, one policy should be pur-
chased for each shareholder.7 7 These policies become assets of the cor-
poration and their presence on the corporate balance sheet, in the
amount of the cash surrender value, may provide added security to a
potential creditor. Conversely, being an asset of the corporation, a cred-
itor can attach these policies as any other asset can be attached.7 8
This plan eliminates the need to pay the insured shareholders, who
normally are the officers of a close corporation, a higher salary so that
they may pay the premiums. The premium payments however are not
tax deductible expenses to the corporation. Depending on the relative
tax brackets of the shareholders and the corporation, it might be more
economical from a tax viewpoint, to pay higher salaries which do con-
stitute deductible expense to the corporation, and have the shareholders
pay the insurance company. There is the possibility, however, that the
Internal Revenue Service might treat the increase in salary as a dividend
distribution. 79
The second type of agreement is the cross-purchase plan. Here, the
remaining shareholders buy the shares of the deceased, disabled or
otherwise departing shareholder. If the agreement is funded by life
insurance, each shareholder usually owns and is the beneficiary of a
policy on the life of another. When there are several shareholders to be
protected, the ownership of the policies and the distribution of premium
payments can become quite complicated and premium payments dispro-
75 Levin, Implied Covenants Against Competition Created by Transactions in Corpo-
rate Stock: Some Thoughts on Tobin v. Cody, 43 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 20 (1963).
76 Ackerman, A Guide to Some Pitfalls of Business 13 (1957).
77 Guild, Stock-Purchase Agreements and the Close Corporation 18 (1960).
78 Id. at 21.
79 Diamond Life Bulletins, Tax Facts on Life Insurance 61 (1967).
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portionate because of age and physical differences.80 It may be advan-
tageous to have each insured purchase the policy on his own life or re-
fund to the holder of the policy on his life any excess premium payments
required to be made."'
The ability of the shareholders to pay the premiums must be con-
sidered in choosing the cross-purchase plan. It is possible, but very un-
wise, to have the corporation pay premiums as these payments undoubt-
edly will be given dividend distribution treatment. It is also possible to
raise the salaries of the shareholders, and this is the way it is usually
done. A third possibility does exist, however, and is often the best so-
lution to the problem of who should pay the premiums. Under a split
dollar plan the corporation can purchase a whole life or endowment
policy on each shareholder to be covered by the agreement. The cor-
poration owns the policy but the shareholders pay a portion of the pre-
mium. The corporation's share of the premium is equal to the yearly
increase in the cash surrender value of the policy. Since the cash sur-
render value increases each year and the total premium payment re-
mains constant, the shareholders' portion will be a falling factor. At the
time the proceeds are paid to the shareholder's beneficiary in return for
the stock of the deceased, the corporation would be entitled to the
amount of cash surrender value built up to that time. The cost to the
corporation is, in the long run, completely recovered.
8 2
A trustee may be used in connection with the cross-purchase plan.
The trustee becomes the beneficiary of the policies and holds the shares
to insure that a smooth transfer will occur at the proper time. The plan
assures prompt performance and completion of the transaction and can
insulate the policies and, in fact, the shares themselves from corporate
and personal creditors.8 3
No matter which plan is chosen, there are several problems which
must be solved before the agreement can be completed and effective.
The first of these is how to fund the agreement. The most common fund-
ing method is insurance, and it is most advisable to consult an expert in
this regard. Oftentimes, the corporation and the individual shareholders
do not feel that they can afford the premiums to obtain the necessary
coverage. There are some techniques for solving this problem which
should be considered, such as to purchase the least expensive insurance,
80 Sexton, Providing Security for the Outgoing Stockholder and Avoiding Tax Dis-
advantages to Selling and Remaining Stockholders, N.Y.U. 24th Inst. on Fed. Tax 555,
556 (1966).
81 Schwartz, Will Your Business Die With You?, 32 #5 Harv. Bus. Rev. 110, 121
(1954).
82 Mehr & Osler, Modem Life Insurance 431, 432 (1961 3rd ed.); Brosterman, The
Complete Estate Planning Guide 74 (1964).
83 Guild, op. cit. supra note 77 at 28; Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation 371 (Char-
tered Life Underwriter Ed. 1961).
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e.g., term insurance. This protection could be carried until such time as
corporate earnings reached a level where whole life or endowment poli-
cies could reasonably be afforded.8 4 If needed, borrowed funds can be
used to purchase the insurance, and while at first glance it seems a poor
way to accomplish the objectives of funding, it does have many advan-
tages which should not be discounted without proper analysis of the over-
all picture.8 5 The use of life insurance, of course, has both its advantages
and limitations. Most assuredly, the buy-out will be conducted smoother
and faster if life insurance is the funding medium than if other methods
were used. Further, the accumulation of funds will be done without
subjecting the earnings on those funds to the payment of income taxes
during the accumulation period. 6 Life insurance, on the other hand,
will be of no help if a shareholder wishes to make a lifetime disposition
of his stock nor will pure life insurance aid in the situation of a dis-
abled shareholder or at a retirement. An endowment policy can be most
useful in the latter case, but the use of installment payments will best
accomplish the objectives of a disability buy-out.
Although life insurance is not the proper funding method for a dis-
ability contingency, health insurance can be used along with installment
payments to accomplish the buy-sell.8 7 It has been suggested by Messrs.
Harmelin and Friedman in one of the very few articles on this subject,
"Disability Insurance in the Business Buy-Out Agreement", 88 that the
proper way to fund the agreement in anticipation of a disability contin-
gency is through noncancelable health insurance which will be used to
make up part of each installment payment. They further recommend that
life insurance which builds cash surrender value should also be main-
tained so that it may be used at the time the health insurance benefits
expire. The definition of disability used in the buy-sell agreement should
coincide with that used in the insurance policy so that there will be no
debate as to whether or not a shareholder is, in fact, disabled.
Installment payments can be used exclusively to fund the agreement
if it can reasonably be expected that the corporation or the shareholders,
depending on the arrangement, will have the liquidity needed to consum-
mate the transaction. If this method is used, a question as to when title
to the stock should pass arises. Possibly the seller could transfer a por-
tion of the stock each time an installment is made, but this does not pre-
clude the transferor from exercising the voting rights of his remaining
shares. Possible voting controversies, therefore, have not been elimi-
84 Schwartz, op. cit. supra n. 81 at 120.
85 Ibid.
86 P-H Corporations, § 1171 (1965).
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nated. The issuance of another class or series of stock in exchange for
the voting stock to be acquired over the installment period seems to be
a reasonable way of avoiding these controversies. Nonvoting stock in the
hands of the heirs or departing shareholder would entitle them to con-
tinue receiving dividends over the buy-out period, but would limit them
from interfering with the smooth operations of the corporation.8 9
Installment payments out of corporate surplus or from the personal
assets of the shareholders can also be an effective means of completing
a buy-out when life insurance is used, but the proceeds are not expected
to cover the amount needed to purchase the shares for full value. 90
Corporate surplus may be used to effect the buy-out, but unless sur-
plus is sufficient immediately upon executing the agreement and is rea-
sonably expected to be sufficient at all times, hence, it appears to be a
mistake, to say the least, to rely upon future accumulated earnings. A
small growing corporation, although it may show considerable surplus
shortly after beginning operations, usually isn't in a very liquid position.
That is, surplus is not a measure of cash and only cash or other very
liquid assets can satisfy a seller.
Once the choice of plan has been made and the funding problem rec-
ognized the next imperative step is to determine the price or method of
determining the price at which the shares will be purchased. Hopefully,
there will be a long lapse of time between the execution of the agreement
and the time at which it becomes operational. Therefore, a problem im-
mediately arises. As of what date should the stock be valued?
The agreement could set a permanent value on the shares at the time
the contract was executed, but this would be a very narrow pessimistic
approach. More realistically, the agreement should provide for a valu-
ation to be ascertained as of the date of death or other departure of the
shareholder, or provide for a periodic review so that when the contin-
gency arises, a valuation will have been made recently. The latter alter-
native seems to be the most advantageous from the standpoint of deter-
mining the adequacy of the funding arrangement and in educating the
shareholders as to just what their business is really worth.
Once the valuation date has been established, the shares must be
valued. The choice of the valuation technique is one the shareholders
should make, and the intent here is only to present basics of several
plans.
The first method which comes to the businessman's mind is book
value. The basic consideration here is one of adequate accounting.9 1
Even if generally accepted accounting principles are used consistently,
89 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-18; 48 Tax Management, Install-
ment Sales A-61 (1965).
90 Harmelin & Friedman, op. cit. supra n. 87.
91 Guild, op. cit. supra n. 77 at 31.
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there are still numerous other problems to consider. Should goodwill be
valued and included in the share valuation? If it is decided to do so, it
would seem proper to ascertain the value of goodwill lost to the corpo-
ration by the departure of the shareholder and to reduce the price the
corporation must pay by that amount.92 Goodwill being an intangible
asset is hard to value as are patents and the like.
An independent appraisal is a second available method of valuation.
It should be done at intervals to be effective, but it can be very expen-
sive. It is feasible for the shareholders to evaluate the assets of the busi-
ness themselves and only seek the opinion of the independent appraiser
if at one of the periodic reviews they fail to agree on a value.93 Reliance
on the appraisal method to determine the fair buy-sell price of the shares
of a small corporation may have a serious drawback if it fails to consider
the existence and value of goodwill.
9 4
An appraisal can be used in connection with a third method, the
capitalization of earnings. Under the capitalization method, earnings of
what are determined to be average years are multiplied by a price-
earnings factor considered proper for the type and size of the particular
business. When the appraisal method and the capitalization method are
combined, the value of the stock is represented by the sum of the ap-
praised tangible assets plus goodwill.95 Goodwill is represented by the
difference between the expected profits of the particular corporation and
the average return on the type and amount of assets as if there was no
goodwill.9 6
The answers derived from the above computation or from the cap-
italization method are only as good as the basic assumptions upon which
the computations are made. Which are the average earning years? At
what rate should earnings be capitalized? What is a normal rate of re-
turn on assets such as the corporation possesses? Some guesswork is
inevitable, but if done by competent persons at stated intervals, the
shareholders will be well informed of their worth.
It is important that all possible contingencies be recognized in draft-
ing the agreement. No doubt death will be the first to be recognized and
planned for. Disability 97 will probably be the last to be thought of de-
spite the fact that the possibility of disability usually is greater than the
possibility of death at the ages of those beginning a business.
92 P-H Corporations, op. cit. supra n. 86 at § 1174.
93 P-H Corporations, op. cit. supra n. 86.
94 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-15.
95 P-H Corporations, op. cit. supra n. 86.
96 Siddel, Stock Purchase Agreements Between Stockholders and Their Corporation,
43 Taxes 306 (1965).
97 Harmelin & Friedman, op. cit. supra n. 87.
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Internal dissension, too, is an opportune moment to effectuate the
provisions of a buy-sell agreement. 9s Dissolution can be avoided by buy-
ing out the dissenting shareholder at the time the irreconcilable differ-
ence arises. Retirement and the voluntary withdrawal of a shareholder
should also be covered by the agreement.
It cannot be repeated too often that the circumstances must dictate
the provisions of any agreement, but I have compiled a checklist which
may be helpful in drafting a buy-sell agreement.
1. Determine the contingencies at the happening of which the agreement
will become operational. Death, voluntary withdrawal, disability,
internal dissension and retirement should all be considered.
2. Determine how the agreement is to be funded. Remember that the
funding arrangement must adequately meet the contingency to be
covered. A combination of funding methods might be necessary.
3. Determine how the shares are to be valued and provide for periodic
revaluations.
4. Determine what type of arrangement is to be used. Who is to own
the policies? Who is to pay the premiums? Who is to receive the
proceeds? These are primarily tax considerations.
5. Determine the type of restriction to be placed on transferability.
Match the restriction with the contingency. Will local law allow it?
6. Make sure all proper persons and entities are parties to the agree-
ment.
7. Provide for termination and amendment of the agreement at the hap-
pening of certain named events.
Tax Considerations
From the moment the corporation is chosen as the business form, the
potential shareholders must be keenly aware that their plans must be
developed with tax consequences in mind. Taxes, however, should not
be the only reason for selecting a certain plan. There may be overriding
factors such as designed control procedures, smooth functioning of the
business or buy-sell agreements, which can only be accomplished by
forsaking some possible tax savings. A complete explanation of all the
tax ramifications of a control agreement would be far beyond the scope
of this article. Therefore, the discussion here will be limited to the basic
problems to be resolved and a short nontechnical approach to each.
Control, as the word has been used so far, has meant the ability to
direct corporate action either by owning and voting a majority of the
stock or by combining voting power through an agreement. Control has
98 In re Astey, 19 Misc. 2d 1059, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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a different meaning under the Internal Revenue Code and becomes im-
portant in determining whether transfers of assets to the corporation
constitute a taxable or nontaxable event.99 Basically, the elements of a
tax free transfer are:
1. Stock or securities must be received in return for the property trans-
ferred to the corporation.
2. The transferor(s) must, immediately after the transfer, own at least
80% of the total voting stock.
3. They must own at least 80% of the total shares of all other stock.
Although the elements appear relatively simple, numerous problems can
arise. Many of these are definitional. For example, what constitutes
property,1° ° what are securities,' 0 ' and what is voting stock?1
0 2
The purpose of introducing this provision of the tax code is merely
to put the drafter of the control agreement on guard. Normally, the
creation of a close corporation will automatically qualify for tax free
treatment as the group of transferors will more than meet the 80% re-
quirements and normally receive only stock in return.
The election to be taxed as a Subchapter S corporation will affect
the way in which control is distributed. In order to elect and maintain
this preferential tax treatment, the corporation may not issue more than
one class of stock. Control arrangements in which the issuance of non-
voting common or preferred stock must be forsaken in favor of debt
securities or a wider distribution of control. Even the use of a voting
agreement might have the effect of destroying Subchapter S treatment,
as it has been held that such agreements, in substance, create a second
class of stock when less than all voting shares are involved. 0 3
Basically, Subchapter S treatment allows a corporation to be taxed
as a partnership. All profits whether distributed or not are taxed to
individual shareholders at their individual rates. The relative tax brack-
ets of the shareholders and the corporation will be the economic factors
to consider when determining the advisability of electing Subchapter S
treatment. From a business standpoint, the election may be disadvan-
tageous if the tax savings are gained at the expense of lost control
and/or additional equity financing.
Problems in Subchapter S taxation do not end with qualifying for
the election initially. If through a subsequent sale or bequest of a share-
holder's interest, the total number of shareholders exceeds ten, the elec-
99 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351; 54-2d Tax Management, Transfers to Controlled Cor-
porations A-13 (1963).
100 101 Tax Management, op. cit. supra note 5 at A-7.
101 Id. at A-8; Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F. 2d 528 (2nd Cir. 1942).
102 54-2nd Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 99.
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1963).
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tion will be lost. Careful drafting of a buy-sell agreement can eliminate
that possibility.
Besides consideration of Subchapter S taxation, initial issuance of
stock and securities can be influenced by other tax considerations. The
advantages of debt financing are obvious. Interest payments are de-
ductible to the corporation whereas dividends are not. Interest payments
must be reasonable for if the debt is, in the Internal Revenue's estima-
tion, really equity, the interest payments will be treated as dividends.
That is not to say that a shareholder may not be a creditor of the cor-
poration. The basic determination of the allowability of interest deduc-
tions is the overall debt-equity ratio-a subject in and of itself.10 4
The repayment of a loan, normally, is a nontaxable event as com-
pared to the redemption of stock which often leads to tax consequences.
The former may, however, be treated as a taxable event if the debt is
regarded as being equity capital. The use of debt financing may have the
further advantage of providing a sufficient reason for accumulation of
earnings over the level at which excess profits tax would be invoked if
the obligation to repay was not present. 0 5 Debt securities may also pro-
vide the basis of a gift program whereby older shareholders, wishing to
divest themselves of some of their assets for estate tax purposes, but re-
tain their proportionate control of the corporation, can give these secu-
ties.106
The use of preferred stock, while giving no tax advantages to the
corporation, can be valuable to the shareholders as a possible method of
getting earnings out of the corporation at capital gains rates. Although
this possibility has been limited by new provisions of the code,' 0 issu-
ance of preferred stock at the beginning of corporate life may still yield
the desired results when the shares are redeemed later on.10 8 On the
other hand, preferred stock financing usually is more expensive than debt
financing simply because the return to the investor on preferred stock
must be made with after-tax dollars.10 9 Interest payments, conversely,
are deductible expenses.
In the discussion of buy-sell agreements no emphasis was placed on
the consideration of who should own and maintain the insurance policies
used to fund the agreement. These decisions are affected by tax con-
siderations.
Premium payments both under cross-purchase and redemption plans
are not deductible either to individual shareholders or to the corpora-
104 Smith, Effects of Taxation-Corporate Financial Policy 156 (1952).
105 Id. at 158.
106 101 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 5 at A-28.
107 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 306.
108 101 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 5 at A-20.
109 Smith, op. cit. supra n. 104 at 17-44.
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tion. n" On the other hand, the proceeds of the policies are not normally
included in gross income. Taxation problems most often arise in deter-
mining whether or not premium payments by the corporation are, in fact,
dividend distributions to shareholders.
When the corporation owns, and is the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy under a redemption plan, the premiums paid by the corporation
are not considered to be dividends to a shareholder. If the beneficiary
of such a policy is a shareholder, the premiums might be given dividend
treatment. The result is not clear, however, as it has been held that if
the shareholder may choose the beneficiary, premiums may not be divi-
dends if the corporation has the remainder of the incidents of ownership
of the policy, and the beneficiary's right to the proceeds only occurs upon
a transfer of the stock to the corporation.11
Premium payments by the corporation pursuant to a cross-purchase
plan will be treated either as additional compensation to the shareholders
or as a dividend. If the determination is made that premiums were addi-
tional compensation, the corporation will be entitled to a deduction in
the amount of the premium payments. If, however, premium payments
cause the compensation being received by shareholders to be unreason-
able in light of earnings or size of the corporation, they will be treated
as dividends."
2
When a trustee has been appointed to receive the proceeds of the
policies and to administer the buy-sell, premium payments made by the
corporation will probably not be treated as a dividend distribution." 3
The cross-purchase plan represents the simplest buy-sell arrange-
ment for tax purposes. The redemption plan has many tax aspects to
consider. As the insurance policies build cash surrender value the
accounting effect is to increase the surplus of the corporation. Under
the Internal Revenue Code, a tax, at an extremely high rate, is imposed
upon excess accumulations of surplus over that which the business can
reasonably justify. Although the accumulated cash surrender values may
not reach a point where the excess profits tax would become a possibility,
if the corporation sets aside funds each year to pay premiums in future
years or builds a sinking fund to make installment payments, the excess
profits tax becomes a real consideration.1 4
There has been no decisive ruling on whether the future obligation
to redeem a shareholder's interest constitutes a reasonable accumulation
110 Bowe, op. cit. supra n. 83 at 370; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 264.
M Diamond Life Bulletins, Tax Facts on Life Insurance 60 (1967); Prunier v. Com-
missioner, 248 F. 2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
112 Diamond Life Bulletins, op. cit. supra note 111 at 61; Yucngling v. Commissioner,
69 F. 2d 971 (3rd Cir., 1934).
113 Doran v. Commissioner, 246 F. 2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
114 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-30; 35-2nd Tax Management-
Accumulated Earnings Tax A-49 (1966).
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of surplus, but at least one authority believes that such an accumulation
would constitute a "strong defense against an effort to impose the penalty
tax on accumulations made to fund that obligation." 115
Unless the redemption is one in complete liquidation of a share-
holder's stock, there is danger that the profit on the redemption may be
taxed as ordinary income. Since stock is a capital asset, capital gains
treatment will normally be accorded the complete redemption. When the
redemption is a partial one, however, the code provides that gain will be
treated as ordinary income. 116 If this were not the case, shareholders
under a preconceived plan of partial redemptions could turn ordinary
income, accumulated earnings and profits, into capital gains by merely
redeeming a portion of their stock. When redemptions are made pro rata,
the shareholders retain their proportionate control.
There are three exceptions to the partial redemption rule. Capital
gains treatment will be accorded the redemption if it is a disproportionate
one, 117 that is that the shareholder has less than 80% of the stock which
he owned before, and his ownership of voting power is less than 50% of
the total.1 18 In determining the percent requirements, stock owned by
the shareholder's spouse, children, parents or grandchildren must be
considered.119
If the shareholder's stock which is redeemed constituted a substan-
tial part of his estate, the redemption will be treated as an exchange and
qualify for capital gains treatment.120 Substantial is considered to be
more than 35% of the gross estate or, alternatively, 50% of the net tax-
able estate. 12 1 Dividend treatment, however, will still be accorded any
profit on the redemption over and above the death taxes, funeral costs
and administrative expenses payable by the estate. 122
The disproportionate redemption may be utilized in the case of a life-
time transfer, but the redemption to pay death taxes, obviously, only
applies at the death of a shareholder.
Another exception to the partial redemption rule is a partial liquida-
tion. This exception will not ordinarily be available to a close corpora-
tion, for to be applicable there must be a real reduction in the corpora-
tion's scope of business as a result of the redemption.12
115 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-33.
116 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301, § 316; 17-2nd Tax Management-Corporate Stock Re-
demption A-3 (1965).
117 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302.
118 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 302(b) (2).
119 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 318(a) (1); Siddell, op. cit. supra note 96; 72 Tax Man-
agement-Constructive Ownership Rules under § 318 (1963).
120 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 303.
121 Ibid.
122 Siddel, op. cit. supra n. 96.
123 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 346; 106 Tax Management, op. cit. supra n. 70 at A-33.
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Use of a stock redemption plan, then, requires tax expertise in its
planning an operation.
A primary advantage to the cross-purchase plan is that when the
remaining shareholders acquire the stock of the deceased or otherwise
departing shareholder, their basis in the newly acquired stock is roughly
what they paid for it. The total amount of each one's equity in the cor-
poration will be spread over a much higher basis in the stock they own
than if the corporation redeemed the shares of the departing shareholder.
Capital gains at a subsequent sale will, therefore, be considerably lower.
Under either plan the heirs of the deceased shareholder will receive
favorable tax treatment for the sale of the shares. The basis of the stock
in their hands is the fair market value at the date of death. If the agree-
ment provided for a reasonable price and the price would have been
available upon a lifetime transfer as well as at death, the agreement will




Caution must be exercised in drafting the shareholders agreement.
Local law, both statutory and case law, must be examined. A valid exer-
cise of shareholder control in one state is not necessarily valid in an-
other. Further, the reader is cautioned to recognize that beyond terms
of an agreement between shareholders, charter and bylaw provisions
must be drafted to enable the corporation to proceed as the shareholders
desire.
There must be a balancing of the objectives in each provision of the
agreement. Business, tax, control and overall shareholder and corporate
objectives require consideration. Teamwork among the shareholders and
experts in each area to be covered is a necessity.
Most basic to creating a workable agreement is the function of plan-
ning. Realism is the key to adequate planning. Consideration should be
given to possible, not only probable, contingencies which might arise.
The plan, however, must be flexible. An amendment properly timed can
forestall otherwise disastrous consequences.
124 Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F. 2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. 2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1932).
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